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Morris: The Leading Purpose Doctrine as Applied to the Statute of Frauds
THE LEADING PURPOSE DOCTRINE
AS APPLIED TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

WMLIAM 0. MoM~IS*
During the Seventeenth Century in England, the jury was
undergoing a rapid transition. It changed from a group of witnesses to a group of nonwitnesses. With this transition, the courts
encountered many problems, not the least of which was the development of a satisfactory method of- controlling jury verdicts.1 To
eliminate some of this difficulty, Parliament enacted the statute of

frauds, which was denominated "An Act for the Prevention of
Frauds and Perjuries."

That portion of the act applicable to the

problem under consideration provides as follows:
"That from and after four and twenty day of June, which
shall be in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred
seventy and seven . . . no action shall be brought whereby to
charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another person: . . . unless
the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or
some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."2
While the act was passed in 1676, it did not become effective until
1677.
The English statute of frauds has been generally recognized
as not being a part of the common law of the United States, and
it is in force here only by virtue of legislation.3 Variations on the
English statute together with some enlargements and additions have
been enacted by the various states. The comparable provision of

the West Virginia Code 4 provides:
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 The opening words of the statute tell much about problems that existed
in England at the time of the adoption of the statute. "For prevention of many
fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by
perjury and subornation of perjury, be it enacted..."
2 The Statute of Frauds, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3. Justice Bliss stated in
Fairall v. Arnold, 226 Iowa 977, 284 N.W. 664 (1939): "It was, in fact, a
statute aimed at juries, because, it was the character and function of a jury,
at that time, that it might decide on its own knowledge alone, and, if it
heard evidence might reject it all." Justice Bliss further stated: "It was drawn
with the aid of some of the ablest judges, chancellors and civilians of that
time."
a McKennon v. Winn, 1 Okla. 327, 83 Pac. 582 (1893): "At the time
of the settlement and discovery of America the statute of frauds had not been
adopted, and has only become the law of the United States or of our several
states and territories, by legislative enactment."
4 W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 1 §1 (Michie 1955).
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"No action shall be brought in any of the following
cises: ...

"(d) To charge any person upon a promise to answer
for the debt, default, or misdoing of another; . . .Unless, the

promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance, or
ratification, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged thereby or his agent.
But the consideration need not be set forth or expressed in the
writing; and it may be proved by other evidence."
The English statute, the West Virginia statute, and the statutes
of other states appear to have been drafted in clear and unambiguous language, but in spite of this precision, the courts have by
judicial legislation held it not applicable to certain oral promises
to answer for the debts of another. It might be equally correct to
say that the courts have made judicial exceptions to the statute.
It is the purpose of the brief discussion to examine one of the recognized exceptions, a situation in which the statute of frauds has
been held not to apply.
We should not be too critical of the courts for the judicial legislation in this area, for in some cases the end justifies the means.
Clearly it is above argument that the statute was enacted in wisdom
and sound policy to prevent the successful use of pretended agreements to force the payment of another's obligation by the use of
perjured testimony. 5 The statute of frauds was intended as a shield
for the innocent, not as a sword for the unconscionable. Whenever
invocation of the statute of frauds in any instance ceases to be a
shield and becomes an instrument whereby one seeks to escape the
responsibilities of his word, and the evidence thereon is clear, the
courts have acted wisely and courageously in stating that the act
was not intended to cover such situations and have determined that
in this instance a man's word should be held to be equal to his bond.
Whether a promise to answer for a debt, for which the promissor was not otherwise liable, is or is not within the statute depends
largely upon the intention of the parties. If it is intended that the
promise is to be collateral, it is within the statute and must be in
writing; if it is an original one, then it is not a promise to answer
for another's debt, but to answer for the promissor's own debt and
need not be in writing.
5 McKennon v. Winn, supra note 3: "The prevention of perjury and
subornation of perjury in connection with the group of matters legislated about
constitute the main purpose of the statute, and all its provisions are but the
legislative means toward such prevention."
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MAn, oR LErmNG PURPOSE DocrrrmE

No better introduction to the main or leading purpose doctrine
can be given than to quote from Howell v. Harvey6 where Judge
Williams speaking for the court said:
"The statute of frauds is one noted for its brevity and the
terseness of its language, yet it has claimed the attention of
the courts of last resort, both in this Country and in England,

more often perhaps than any other law. It is practically the
same in all the states. It was enacted to relieve persons and
their estates against false and fictitious claims, by requiring the
highest order of proof to establish liability in cases where it
is sought to recover against a person as a mere voluntary surety
or guaranty of another. But it has been perhaps as frequently
invoked to avoid liability as it has been relied upon to protect
against injustice. The courts have said that it shall not be
perverted and made the instrument of accomplishing a wrong,
and have, therefore, in the vast majority of cases construed
to have no application to those cases where there is a consideration supporting the oral promise to answer for the debt or
obligation of another, other than the release of the original
obligor, or the extinguishment of the old debt, or promise. If
the promisor derives a benefit from his oral promise which he
did not otherwise have, his promise becomes a new and
7 original
one, and falls not within the purview of the statute."
From this language it is clear that situations exist wherein an oral
promise to answer for the debts of another is enforceable. The
exception to, or nonapplicability of, the statute of frauds as mentioned in the above quoted statement is referred to as the main or
leading purpose doctrine where applied to the statute of frauds.
The cases involving the main or leading purpose doctrine roughly
fall into two groups. Consideration will be given first to the group
of cases wherein a shareholder has orally agreed to become responsible for the purchases of the corporation in which he is a
shareholder; and secondly, an examination will be undertaken of
the cases involving the contractor-builder relation, where the one
having the building constructed orally undertakes to be responsible
for the debts of the builder for materials and labor employed in
the construction.
Stockholder's Obligation
The question presented is simply: Is the statute of frauds applicable to an oral promise made by a shareholder, officer or director
6 65 W. Va. 810,64 S.E. 249 (1909).
7 Id. at 814, 64 S.E. at 251.
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of a corporation to be responsible for the debts of the corporation?
The courts have stated that original promises are not to be held
within the statute of frauds and therefore need not be written, but
that collateral ones are within the statute and must be in writing
to be enforceable as against the assertion of the statute.8 This statement would appear to answer the question raised, but it is difficult,
if not impossible, to find a satisfactory yardstick for measuring and
determining the meaning of the words "original" and "collateral"
as applied to such promises. 9 The application of this test does not
always give a satisfactory answer.
In the Howell case, supra, the court said:
"The rule by which to determine whether a promise is
original, or collateral and without consideration, is thus stated
in 29 A. & E. E. L. (2nd Ed.) 929: 'An absolute promise to
pay the debt of another is not within the statute though the liability of the original subsists where the leading object of the
promisor is to subserve some pecuniary interest or business
purpose of his own, and he receives a benefit which he did
riot before10 enjoy, and would not have possessed but for the
promise'."
It is clear that, if the promisor-shareholder is only to receive
a benefit which likewise accrues to other shareholders to the same
extent, the benefit from the performance by the promisor of his
obligation to the corporation is not direct but collateral and his
promise would not be legally enforceable as against the assertion
of the statute of frauds. Where the promisor is to receive some
benefit dirctly to himself, as distinguished from a benefit to the
corporation, then his promise is considered a primary one and not
within the statute, for then he is promising to answer for his own
debt and only incidentally for the debt of another.
Two cases decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals may be used as typical illustrations of the use of the main
or leading purpose doctrine to that portion of the statute of frauds
dealing with a promise to pay the debt of a corporation. First,
8 The fact that the promisor receives the benefit of the transaction should

be considered as strong evidence that his promise was primary as distinguished
from collateral. Schoengeld v. Brown, 71 Ill. 487 (1875).

9 Whether the promise is original or collateral should be determined b

all the circumstances relating to the transaction. Bonner & M. Co. v. Hansel,
189 I. App. 474 (1914). For an interesting article on the problem of distinguishing collateral from primary promises, see, Simpson, A Suggested Test

for Application of the Main Purpose Rule Under the Statute of Frauds, 36
CALrF. L. REv. 405 (1948).
10 65 W. Va. at 314, 64 S.E. at 251.
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consideration will be given to one of the leading cases in the United
States on this point, Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman.11 In that
case defendant took a lease on some coal land. Subsequently the defendant organized the Goodman Coal and Coke Company to develop
the leased land and assigned the lease to the company. The defendant was a heavy stockholder in that corporation and served as its
president and treasurer. The company encountered financial difficulties and the defendant orally agreed to become responsible for
the purchases of the company. This promise was made to those
from whom the company was seeking credit. In reliance upon this
oral undertaking credit was extended to the now bankrupt company. The present plaintiff as well as other creditors of the company
filed their claims against the company in the bankruptcy proceedings
and received their share of the company's assets upon distribution
of the bankrupt's estate. The facts clearly evidenced that the sellers
in charging the goods to and having demanded payment from the
company indicated that they had treated the company as the debtor.
The fact that the plaintiff proved his claim in the bankruptcy proceedings strengthened the view of the defendant that the plaintiff
had relied upon and dealt with the company as the principal
2
debtor.1
The facts of the Hurst case do not show that the defendant
Goodman had any interest in the transaction other than as officer
and shareholder of the debtor company. The issue simply is: Does
the mere interest that one has as a stockholder and officer in a corporation take his oral promise to answer for the debts of the corporation from operation of the statute of frauds? The question was
answered in the negative by the court when it stated the applicable
law as follows:
"Here the charging of the goods to the corporation, rendition of statements to it and assertion of claims therefor against
it in the bankruptcy proceedings, all admitted by the plaintiff,
effectually precluded a finding in its favor....
"In almost every instance of assumption of one man's debt
by another, there is some reason for the promise, some benefit
accruing to the promisor as well as the debtor. The acknowl1168 W. Va. 468, 102 S.E. 216 (1910).
12 In Shepherd v. Butcher Tool & Hardware Co., 198 Ala. 275, 73 So. 498
(1916) the court held that where the goods were delivered to the contractor

and credit was given to the contractor any promise made by one having the
building built would be collateral and within the statute of frauds. The court
considered it important to whom credit was given in determining whether the
promise was primary or collateral.
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edged and expressly declared purpose of the statute is to preclude the establishment of rights by oral testimony, when the
situation of the parties is such as to constitute a strong motive
for perjury and fraud in establishing a liability, or the false
extension or amplification of conversations and transactions
so as to make them impose obligations lying beyond their real
scope and effect. To this end, it ordains and declares that no
action shall lie to charge any person upon a promise to answer
for the debt, default or misdoings of another, unless the promise
or some memorandum or note thereof be in writing signed by
the party to be charged thereby or his agent. Tested by its
letter, the statute inhibits proof of an oral promise to pay the
debt of a third person. That some benefit accrues to the promisor for the services rendered or the property sold and delivered,
to such third person does not necessarily make the debt that
of the promisor or prevent it from being that of such third
person. If the debt is that of another and not of the promisor
the terms of the statute include it, and incidental benefit,
accruing to the promisor cannot exclude it. If, on the other
hand, the debt is that of the promisor, the promise is not within
the statute though a third person may be incidentally
relieved
of an obligation in subsequence of payment."13
The facts of the Hurst case further indicate that Goodman had
no lien upon the property of the company nor held any other right
by which the benefits accruing to the company could be said to
benefit him directly. Here Goodman's only benefit was as any other
shareholder, which was incidental and indirect. The defendant may
have benefited incidentally and remotely by the extension of credit
to the corporation, but so did all other shareholders and possibly
other creditors of the firm. The court quite correctly held the
promise within the evils at which the statute of frauds was directed
and that the oral promise of Goodman was not enforceable.
Twenty-six years after the decision of the Hurst case the court
was called upon to consider a similar situation in the case of Tynes
v. Shore.14 At the outset of the discussion of this case it must be
said that the language in the opinion is not altogether clear. In the
Tynes case a company known as the Motor Company purchased
a leasehold interest from the plaintiff and had given its notes to
evidence the amount due thereunder. Later the defendant, Shore,
acquired all but two shares of the stock of the Motor Company. The
facts do not indicate how many other shares were outstanding or
what portion of the shares were owned by Shore. The defendant
13 Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman, 68 W. Va. 462, 464, 69 S.E. 898,
901 (1910).
14 117 W. Va. 355, 185 S.E. 845 (1936.)
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had assumed absolute control of the company. The court said "Witnesses for plaintiff testified that defendant had frequently said he
owned and was the Motor Company; that at the first conference
with Tynes (1932) defendant stated that the notes of the Motor
Company held by Tynes had become his (defendant's) obligation
and Tynes was to look to him for payment ..
"15
The court recognized that whether the promise of a person
to pay the debt of another for which he was not previously liable
would fall within the language of the statute of frauds depended
upon whether the promisor intended to create a primary obligation
on his part. That is, if he intended the promise to be collateral, it
is within the statute and must be in writing to be enforceable; if
the promise is intended as an original one, it is not within the
statute and need not be in writing. The court said:
"Here the undisputed evidence shows that defendant meant
for his promise to be taken as original. Furthermore, the evidence-his own evidence-justifies the finding that the Motor
Company is merely a corporate simulacrum appropriated to
his personal business; and that the notes in question, though
nominally those of the Motor Company, are in fact his personal
obligations."16
Further, the court stated that "Courts will not permit a person,
acting under guise of corporation to evade individual responsibility."17 It might be asked whether the promise of the defendant,
being an original promise as distinguished from a collateral one,
is not within the statute because the promise was made to obtain
a direct benefit to himself and only incidentally for the other
person's benefit The fact that the defendant owned all but two
nominal shares of the stock in the Motor Co. certainly made it
easier for the court to reach its result. The court stated that "when
it appears that a corporation is merely a simulacrun appropriated
to the personal business of an individual, the corporate entity may
be disregarded."18 But certainly the court does not by this statement mean to infer that it is holding the defendant liable for the
corporate debts merely because he owns all but two nominal shares
of the corporation. The court is basing its final decision on the
finding that the promise of the defendant is direct and the benefits
to be received in consideration of his promise moves directly to him.
15 Id. at 357, 185 S.E. at 846.
16 Id. at 358, 185 S.E. at 846.
17 Id. at 859, 185 S.E. at 847.
's Id. syllabus 3, 185 S.E. at 845.
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The courts in several jurisdictions have held that where the
shareholder makes the promise to answer for the debts of the
corporation at the time the credit is extended so as to acquire a
direct benefit to himself, separate and apart from that moving to
the other shareholders, and the fact that the promise was primary
in form, makes it his debt and therefore not within the statute. The
courts have been more willing to find the promise not to be within
the statute where the promisor owns all or substantially all of the
stock of the corporation than where he is only an incidental shareholder. The corporate veil should never be permitted, nor was it
so intended, to be used as a shield to escape one's truly personal
obligations, but on the other hand the shareholder should not be
indiscriminatally held for the debts of the corporation.
While the two principal West Virginia cases on the point have
been discussed, some mention should be made of two other cases
here relevant-City of Elkins v. Elkins Elec. Ry. Co.19 and Security
Bank Note Co. v. Shrader.20 The first case appears to be more
important because of dicta therein than because of the ultimate
holding. McSpadden was president of the Railway Company and
owned ninety-five percent of its stock. The Railway Company and
McSpadden made an application to a surety company requesting
it to become surety on an undertaking of the company to the City
of Elkins, both agreeing to indemnify the surety against loss which
it might sustain. The bond (surety) was executed by the Railway
Company as principal, but McFadden did not execute it himself
as a principal. The Railway Co. defaulted in the obligation for
which the bond was given and damages are now sought.
The opinion the court proposed this question: "Does the fact
that McSpadden would be benefited by having the debts of the
railway company paid for which he was liable as endorser or surety
make him in fact the principal in the transaction, or, if not, is this
a sufficient consideration for his oral promise to be liable to perform
the obligation, conceding that he made such a promise?" The court
answered its question as follows: "The fact that the principal stock1'187 W. Va. 350, 105 S.E. 233 (1920). For cases which dealt with
promises made before anything was due under the contract, and held the
promise to be within the statute see Hatfield v. Dow, 27 N.J.L. 440 (1859);
Billow v. Miller, 211 Ill. App. 214 (1918). For cases which held the promise
not to be within the statute see Granit City Lime & Cement Co. v. Board of
Education, 203 Ill. App. 134, (1916); Benbow v. Soothsmith, 76 Iowa 151,
40 N.W. 693 (1888); Oldenburg & Kelly v. Dorsey, 102 Md. 172, 62 Atl.
576 (1905); Way v. Baydush, 133 Va. 400, 112 S.E. 611 (1922).
2(70 W. Va. 475, 74 S.E. 416 (1912).
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holder and president was the efficient agent on its behalf does not
of itself impose any liability upon him to perform the obligation
which he undertook on behalf of the company, nor is it a sufficient consideration for a verbal promise made by him to become

liable ... "21
It is clear that the promise made by McSpadden to the surety
company to indemnify it would not be a promise to answer for the
debt of another and would not need to be in writing, as the promise
was made for the purpose of saving the debtor, not the creditor,
harmless. But the fact that MeSpadden would be liable on his
indemnity contract, even though oral, would be of little or no importance in determining whether the creditor might hold him liable.
Here it is clear that the contract was made between the City of
Elkins and the company and not by McSpadden. The court held
that the fact that the principal shareholder, owner of ninety-five
per cent of the stock, who promises to indemnify a surety company
for any loss suffered by the surety company as a result of being a
surety for the company will not make the shareholder liable to the
creditor (City of Elkins). Since no promise of the shareholder
was made to save the creditor harmless, none will be inferred merely
because of his substantial ownership in the corporation. The court
has properly refused to pierce the corporate veil in order to reach
the shareholder for the obligation of the corporation.
In the Security Bank Note case,2 2 defendant Shrader, whose
interest in the West Virginia Consolidated Coal Company was not
shown, ordered certain engraved certificates. (Shrader appeared to
occupy some position of importance either in organizing or operating the coal company.) Shrader told the plaintiff, "Make out your
bill to me for the West Virginia Consolidated Coal Company."
From this statement it was uncertain to whom credit was actually
extended. The court stated:
"The vital and controlling inquiry upon this evidence was,
to whom did the plaintiff extend credit or upon whom did it
rely, as the real debtor for payment? That the supplies furnished were intended for use by the coal company is not conclusive upon this inquiry. All the facts and circumstances
23
must be considered. The question is one of intent."
The court felt that it was a jury question as to whom the credit had
been extended.
2187
W. Va. 350, 854, 105 S.E. 285, 236.
22
Security Bank Note Co. v. Shrader, 70 W. Va. 475, 74 S.E. 416 (1912).
23 Id. at

477, 74 S.E. at 417.
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Contractor-Builder Relation
The contractor-builder relation, being within the main or leading
purpose doctrine, is best illustrated by the case of Howell v. Harvey. 24 The facts in this case are: Peyton contracted to build a
building for Harvey. Payton sublet part of the work to Howell,
the defendant, who proceeded with his work until his employees
quit because Peyton had not paid Howell. Peyton then failed.
Howell claimed Harvey told him "for God's sake go on with this
work; finish this post office building if you don't do it, it will ruin
us." Witnesses testified that Harvey told Howell he would pay him.
Howell finished the work and the defendant Harvey refused to pay
the plaintiff.
The defendant relied upon the statute of frauds, although he
had not specially pleaded it. The court noted that in some jurisdictions the statute must be specially pleaded, but in West Virginia
and Virginia such special plea is not necessary where the defendant
by either plea or answer denies the contract declared upon. The
court: stated: "The plea of non-assumpsit is broader in its scope
than most other pleas, and under it defendant may invoke the
statute of frauds."25 The defendant, Harvey, claimed that since the
plaintiff, Howell, was surety on Peyton's bond to the defendant,
Harvey, it was material to show that the plaintiff was not induced
to complete the work because of the promise made by the defendant, but that he did it to relieve himself from a liability greater
than -his loss of pay for services. The court justified its holding for
plaintiff by stating: "Here, then, was a benefit moving directly from
the promisee to the promisor by virtue of his promise, which he did
not have without such promise, and the new consideration was sufficient to support the promise to pay what was then due, as well as
to pay for services to be thereafter rendered."2 6
This last statement by the court is most interesting in that the
court: appears to have failed to distinguish between the promisor's
obligation to pay the promisee sum or sums already due at the time
of the oral promise, and the sum or sums to become due subsequent
to the oral promise. No quarrel is to be made with the holding that
the benefit moving to the promisor from the performance of the
obligation by the promisee is sufficient to take the case from the
operation of the statute of frauds by application of the main or
24 65 W. Va. 310, 64 S.E. 249 (1909).
25 Id. at 312, 64 S.E. at 250.
26 Id. at 321, 64 S.E. at 254.
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leading purpose doctrine, but as to the sum already owing at the
time of the promise it is most difficult to treat this promise as being
outside the statute. For this question may then be asked: Where
is the promisor to receive any benefit from his promise to pay for
the materials and services which have already been delivered or
performed? It is clear that the reason for making the promise to
pay for the goods and services already furnished and those to be
furnished was to enable the promisor to get his building completed

and is supported by consideration. But consideration alone is not
sufficient to make the statute inapplicable. At this junction the
problem becomes two-fold. If the oral promise to pay is conditional
upon default by the principal obligor to pay that for which the
principal obligor is already liable to the promisee, such promise
is collateral and within the statute of frauds27 against the collateral
promisor unless in writing. The second situation which is even
more troublesome is where the promise is absolute in form and
encompasses materials and labor for which the contractor is already
liable to the promisee as well as for labor and materials to be subsequently furnished. Some courts have treated such a promise as
divisible2 8 and the promisee may only recover against the promisor
for the goods and labor performed after the promise, and have
denied recovery, as against the defense of the statute of frauds,
for the sum due as represented by the materials and labor furnished
before the making of the oral promise. This distinction seems to
29
be imperative.

27
Where the goods were delivered to the contractor and credit was given
to the contractor, any promise made by the one having the building built
would be collateral and within the statute of frauds. Shepherd v. Butcher
Tool 28
& Hardware Co., 198 Ala. 275, 73 So. 498 (1916).
Promise made to seller to pay for goods to be delivered and for
materials which had been previously delivered. Court held such a promise
on part of the promisor to be divisible and held that the statute of frauds was
applicable to the promise to pay for the goods which had already been delivered
at the time of the promise. Gibson County v. Cincinnati Steam Heating Co.,
128 Ind.
29 240, 27 N.E. 612 (1891).
Where the promise was not confined to the part of the debt to become
due, but included also the part already due, it was held to be simply a verbal
promise to pay the whole debt. Where such a promise is entire, as it was in
this case, and it relates in part to matters which render it necessary, under
the statute of frauds, to be in writing, the whole promise is void. Engleby v.
Harvey, 93 Va. 440, 25 S.E. 225 (1896).
Defendant had contracted to have a vault excavated by C. C in turn hired
plaintiff to do the job. Plaintiff after having worked one day went to the
defendant and stated he would not complete the job unless the defendant
promised to pay him. The defendant told the plaintiff to finish the job and
'he would be paid." Held: Promise original and not void under the statute
of frauds. It was not a promise to answer for the debt or default of C. Court
allowed recovery for work completed before promise was made as well as
for that portion of the work done after the promise. Devlin v. Woodgate,
34 Barb. (N.Y.) 252 (1861).
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An exception should never be extended beyond the point necessary to make the operation of the rule just and workable. The main
or leading purpose doctrine may be considered an exception to the
clear language of the statute of frauds and should be enlarged no
further than to correct and avoid the evils which might be magnified
by the strict application of the statute. However, when the court
applies the main or leading purpose doctrine to cover promises to
pay for labor or materials which have already been furnished at
the time of the promise the court is losing sight of both the statute
and the doctrine and is invading the province of the legislature, and
may be creating a greater evil than the one sought to be avoided.
The main or leading purpose doctrine should never be applied to
situations wherein the credit, materials or labor have already been
furnished at the time of the promise, but should only apply to
promises made to gain present or future materials and services.
Where the contractor has perfected a mechanic's lien against
the property for goods and labor already delivered, the release of
such a lien by the promisee to the promisor would clearly be for
the benefit of the promisor and would come within the main or
leading purpose doctrine and would be enforceable although oral. 3 0
Of course here we would have a present release of consideration
from the promisee to the benefit of the promisor and would in one
sense of the word be a promise for goods which have already been
delivered, but the surrender of the lien should suffice as sufficient
consideration to bring the promise within the doctrine.
The Custard case 31 decided after the Howell case further clarifies te contract-builder situation. The court found that where one
acting on behalf of the creditor "verbally notified defendants to proceed with the plumbing and assured then that if they did the Board
would pay them out of the balance due the Construction Co." such
promise was not within the statute of frauds. The court further
stated: "[T] he Board derived some benefit to itself thereby, which
it otherwise would not have had, and for that reason it is an original
promise and not within the statute of frauds."32 While the court
seemed to decide the present case on the basis of the main or leading
purpose doctrine it seems that the court could just as well have
30 REsTATEMENT, SECur=ris § 92 (1941). See, Kampman v. Pittsburgh
Contracting & Eng'r Co., 316 Pa. 502, 175 Ad. 396 (1984).
31 Custard v. McNary, 85 W. Va. 516, 102 S.E. 216 (1920).
32

Id. at 518, 102 S.E. at 218.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss4/4

12

Morris: The Leading Purpose Doctrine as Applied to the Statute of Frauds

DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO STATUTE OF FRAUDS 351
said that it was a promise to pay from the principal debtors funds
in its hands and not within the statute for that reason. While the
desired result was reached the court did not give as 4orough coverage to the problem as it might have given thereto.
SUMMARY

From the previously considered cases it seems clear that the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized the main
or leading purpose doctrine and is in general accord with the laws
of the sister states in applying the statute of frauds in both the
stockholder-corporation and the contractor-builder situations. If the
court finds that the promise was made for the purpose of obtaining
a present benefit to the promisor which moves directly to him, then
such oral promise is deemed a primary one and not within the evils
at which the statute of frauds was aimed. The court should be
extremely careful in any enlargement of this doctrine, for each additional situation, wherein the doctrine is held to apply, weakens the
statute of frauds to that extent. A rule with many exceptions ceases
to be a rule and only confusion and uncertainty can result.
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